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urrent U.S. bankruptcy law has two separate bankruptcy procedures,
knownasChapter7andChapter13. Whenadebtorﬁlesforbankrupt-
cy under Chapter 7, he or she must give up all assets not legally
sheltered from creditor seizure in exchange for a discharge of almost all pre-
existing debts. Under Chapter 13, a debtor may keep all property in exchange
for a promise to pay all or some speciﬁed part of his or her debts under a
payment plan approved by the court.1 Between 1980 and 1999, the total
number of U.S. personal bankruptcy ﬁlings rose from 331,257 to nearly 1.4
million per year, and the rate of consumer bankruptcies per 100,000 adults
increased from 201 to 650. Most bankruptcy ﬁlings during that period (about
70 percent) were under Chapter 7 as opposed to Chapter 13, which accounts
for much of the increase in the total rates. As a result, net losses to creditors
grew twice as fast as consumer installment credit during those years; today,
those losses are counted in the tens of billions of dollars.
Thecontinuedclimbinconsumerbankruptcyratesandtheresultinglosses
to creditors have generated considerable debate and led to a number of bank-
ruptcy reform proposals. Although there is as yet no consensus concerning
the driving force behind the drastic upward trend in U.S. personal bankruptcy
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ﬁlings,2 researchers, practitioners, and politicians are in agreement that the
current U.S. consumer bankruptcy system needs serious reform. Many pro-
posals for reform focus on bankruptcy choices, particularly whether Chapter
13 should be encouraged over Chapter 7. The National Bankruptcy Review
Commission, for example, recently recommended reforms that would elimi-
nate reafﬁrmations of debt altogether. Under this recommendation, all debts
wouldbeforgivenandtherewouldbenoChapter13bankruptcy. Ontheother
hand, the Gekas bill, which has passed the House of Representatives, H.R.
3150, views Chapter 13 as an alternative to be encouraged over Chapter 7.
The bill will force bankrupt debtors whose income is above the median to
use all of their post-bankruptcy earnings above a predetermined level to repay
debt. The credit industry supports the Gekas bill.
Changes in bankruptcy provisions will affect which chapter bankrupts
choose, should they elect bankruptcy. In addition, bankruptcy provisions will
affect how attractive bankruptcy is in comparison to the option of repaying
debts in full as scheduled. Thus, changes in bankruptcy provisions will have
an effect on the likelihood of bankruptcy. The odds of a borrower declaring
bankruptcywillaffecttheriskinessoftheloan, andthuswillaffectriskpremia
charged by competitive lenders and, in turn, borrowers’loan demand and the
rate of return to savers in the economy. The likelihood that future income will
begarnishedtorepayaloanwillaffectborrowers’choicesregardingincome—
labor “effort,” for example—but this can be seen as a stand-in for a broader
array of incentive effects. To fully analyze the implications of a change in
bankruptcy provisions, one must take into account these incentive effects as
wellasthegeneralequilibriumeffects. Ipresentasimpletractableframework
for capturing these effects. It may not be detailed enough to be calibrated to
currentstatisticalobservations, butitdoesprovidereliablequalitativeanswers
to the key questions: What are the characteristics of those that are affected by




the possibility that their income or wealth might fall at the time when they
have to repay their loans. Thus, borrowers and creditors share the risk of
a fall in borrowers’ income or wealth. The implicit assumption here is that
consumers cannot fully insure against their idiosyncratic income risk. This
market incompleteness can arise because of informational problems. For
instance, ifindividualincomesareprivateinformationandhenceunveriﬁable,
then it may be impossible to provide any insurance against the risks that
2 Two competing explanations are declining bankruptcy stigma, which led to increasing abuse
of the system by borrowers, and the increasingly reckless practices of major consumer creditors,
especially credit card issuers.W. Li: U.S. Consumer Bankruptcy Choices 3
individuals face. If there are adverse selection problems (different groups of
individuals have different risk characteristics; these are private information,
and therefore insurance companies protect themselves by penalizing entire
groups rather than single persons), then some groups may be prevented from
buying as much insurance as they would like (Aiyagari 1997).3 Accordingly,
intheeconomicenvironmentstudiedhere,individualsfaceﬂuctuatingincome
streams and can save through a riskless saving instrument and can borrow as
well. They borrow in order to smooth their consumption intertemporally.4
My analysis suggests that given labor income and outstanding debt, an in-
dividual will ﬁle for bankruptcy if his or her assets fall below a certain thresh-
old. This threshold varies negatively with income. Among those who ﬁle for
bankruptcy, individuals with higher assets and lower income tend to choose
Chapter 13, while those with lower assets and higher income tend to choose
Chapter 7. These ﬁndings, then, conﬁrm the general view on consumers’
bankruptcy choices. My discussion also indicates that ex ante, individuals
may hold assets and debts simultaneously. In other words, bankruptcy provi-
sions provide an incentive for people to borrow in order to save. Furthermore,
Chapter13decreasesaperson’slaboreffort. Totheextentthatthislaboreffort
is not directly observable, it can be measured by a person’s labor productivity.
In terms of policy experiments, I focus on three policy instruments: asset
exemption levels under Chapter 7, the percentage of labor income that can
be garnished under Chapter 13, and a mandated income rule for Chapter 13.
My analysis shows that there is an efﬁciency tradeoff among the policies and
that their distributive effects differ greatly. In particular, an increase in the
asset exemption level under Chapter 7 beneﬁts people with medium assets
and medium labor income; ex ante, they will save less and borrow more.
3 Brunstad (2000) discusses a list of issues, which he refers to as “problems of economic
futility,” that require a unique legal system of bankruptcy law.
4 This article’s modeling strategy is most closely related to those of Athreya (2000) and
Lehnert and Maki (1999). Both Athreya and Lehnert and Maki, however, study only bankruptcy
ﬁlings under Chapter 7. Wang and White (2000) and Adler, Polak, and Schwartz (2000) research
issues similar to those I investigate. Although Wang and White make different assumptions about
consumer behavior (they assume that some strategic households can hide part of their wealth so
as to get maximum ﬁnancial beneﬁt under the bankruptcy system) and focus on different aspects
of policy analysis (optimal personal bankruptcy procedures), my article is consistent with theirs
in that both studies conﬁrm the general view that households with relatively more wealth ﬁle
for Chapter 13. Adler, Polak, and Schwartz treat loan borrowing as exogenous and investigate
how private contractual arrangement affects consumers’ bankruptcy choices within a principal/agent
framework. Empirically, Domowitz and Sartain (1999) estimate qualitative choice models of con-
sumers’ decisions to ﬁle for bankruptcy and their choice of bankruptcy chapter. They ﬁnd that
medical and credit card debt are the strongest contributors to bankruptcy. Higher marriage rates,
employment rates, and income all encourage the choice of Chapter 13 rehabilitation over Chapter
7. Additionally, higher levels of equity relative to debt push debtors into Chapter 13. Nelson
(1999) also studies consumer bankruptcy and chapter choice using state panel data. He ﬁnds that
both homestead exemption laws and garnishment laws are statistically signiﬁcant for bankruptcy
choices. Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook (1989) do case studies and discuss in great detail the
characteristics of a sample of personal bankruptcy ﬁlings.4 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
The general equilibrium price effects may dampen these results. A reduction
in the percentage of labor income that can be collected by creditors under
Chapter 13 beneﬁts individuals with high assets and good labor income; ex
ante, people exert less labor effort. Finally, the implementation of the labor
income threshold for Chapter 13 will affect negatively those with few assets
and medium labor income; ex ante, people exert less labor effort.
1. THE U.S. CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM
An Overview of the Basic Law
ThekeyaspectofthecurrentU.S.bankruptcylawisthattherearetwoseparate
personal bankruptcy procedures, known as Chapter 7 and Chapter 13, and
debtors are allowed to choose between them. Both procedures discharge
many types of debts, causing losses for creditors.
Debtors who ﬁle under Chapter 7 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code are not
obliged to use future income to repay their debts and are only obliged to use
wealth to repay debt to the extent that their wealth exceeds predetermined
exemption levels. In other words, under Chapter 7 the bankruptcy court dis-
charges all eligible debts so that the debtor enjoys a “fresh start.” Chapter 7
asset exemptions fall into two categories: homestead (applied to equity in a
home used as a primary residence) and non-homestead. Although bankruptcy
is a matter of federal law and the rules are uniform across the United States,
asset exemption levels under Chapter 7 are set by the state in which the debtor
lives and vary widely. For instance, 7 states (Arizona, Florida, Kansas, Min-
nesota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Texas) have unlimited homestead ex-
emptions, while 20 others (includingAlabama, California, and Georgia) have
homestead exemptions of $7,500 or less for individual debtors (see White
[1998], Table 1, for Chapter 7 exemptions for all states and the District of
Columbia). Non-homestead exemptions are less clear cut. State laws fre-
quently allow households to exempt 100 percent of the value of a speciﬁc type
ofasset. Forexample,manystatesexempt100percentofthevalueofclothing
for personal use.
Alternatively, debtors can ﬁle for bankruptcy under Chapter 13, which
offers virtually the opposite option. In Chapter 13 the law allows debtors to
keepallproperty, exemptandnonexempt, inexchangeforapromisetopayall
or some speciﬁed part of their debts under a three- to ﬁve-year payment plan
approved by the court. The remainder of the debt will be discharged. There
are several restrictions attached to the repayment plan. First, Chapter 13 sets
minimum amounts that must be paid under a plan. For secured creditors, the
minimumpaymentmustatleastmatchthevalueofthecollateral,plusinterest,
but may be made over a time longer than the requirements of the statute.
Certain unsecured creditors with special priorities (such as tax authorities,
former spouses, and children with support orders) receive payment in full.W. Li: U.S. Consumer Bankruptcy Choices 5
Figure 1 Annual Bankruptcy Filings as a Percent of TotalAdult
Population—United States
The minimum amount that must be paid to the rest of the unsecured creditors
equals the disposable income remaining after necessary living expenses are
paid and the secured and priority debt payments are made. Second, debtors
must propose to pay at least as much as the creditors would have received
under Chapter 7. Third, the statute requires that debtors propose plans in
good faith, which is generally interpreted to mean that debtors must make
some repayment even if there would have been none under Chapter 7; the
amount required varies tremendously from district to district.
Debtors whose debts are discharged under either Chapter 7 or Chapter 13
are released from prebankruptcy debts, but they are ineligible for Chapter 7
for six years. Only debtors who pay in full under Chapter 13 remain eligible
for a Chapter 7 bankruptcy discharge during the following six years. Credi-
tors, especiallyunsecuredcreditors, generallyfavoraChapter13arrangement
sincetheymayactuallyreceivesomepaymentunderChapter13; underChap-
ter 7, they will be repaid only if debtors’ assets exceed the exemption level.
Nevertheless, most credit agencies identify all Chapter 13 debtors, regardless
of their payment success, as having taken bankruptcy.
Recent Trends
Figure 1 depicts annual bankruptcy ﬁlings as a percent of the total adult pop-
ulation from 1980 to 1999 in the United States. Bankruptcy rates per 1,0006 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
adults remained relatively stable from 1980 to 1984 but later exploded, mov-
ing from 1.2 in 1984 to 7.2 in 1998. The increase in bankruptcy rates lessened
slightly in 1999. At current levels, 2 percent of American adults ﬁle for per-
sonal bankruptcy every three years. What was formerly a rarity is now almost
commonplace. Also notable in Figure 1 is that about 70 percent of consumer
bankruptcies are ﬁled under Chapter 7. Moreover, Chapter 7 ﬁlings have
increased at a faster rate than Chapter 13 ﬁlings. On the basis of this observa-
tion and the notion that Chapter 7 may be more harmful to the society since
debtors do not need to repay any of their debts, Congress and the credit in-
dustry have formed the view that Chapter 13 should be greatly encouraged (or
even mandated) so as to prevent the increasing abuse of the current system.5
2. A THEORETICAL MODEL
The Economic Environment
I will now consider a two-period economic model. The model has several
important features. First, agents6 face an uninsurable idiosyncratic shock
to period 2 wages, and they smooth their consumption over the two periods
throughborrowingandsaving. Speciﬁcally,agentscansavethroughariskless
saving instrument and can borrow as well. As mentioned earlier, the introduc-
tion of this feature is to provide a potential role for bankruptcy laws. Second,
agents need to exert effort in order to receive positive labor income for period
2. More importantly, an individual’s choice of effort level is unobservable. It
isthereforeimpossibletomakecontractscontingentoneffortlevels. Iassume
that the income an agent receives in period 2 is a product of his or her effort
level and the idiosyncratic shock. This product can also be viewed as total
output produced by the agent. In that sense, the labor effort of each agent
affects the total output of the economy. For the remaining analysis, I will ﬁrst
treat a representative agent in isolation, taking borrowing and lending rates as
given. I will then embed that model in a general equilibrium setting in order
to endogenize the borrowing and lending rates.
In period 1, an agent enters the economy endowed with some assets a1
and a signal θ1, which indicates the quality of the agent’s period 2 labor
income. An agent draws utility from consumption in both periods, disutility
from working in period 2, and a utility penalty from ﬁling for bankruptcy in
5 Some researchers, however, dispute this view. White (1998), for example, argues that a
much higher fraction of U.S. households would beneﬁt ﬁnancially from bankruptcy than actually
ﬁle under current bankruptcy provisions.
6 I use the words “agent,” “person,” and “individual” interchangeably throughout this article.
I assume that there is a continuum of agents in the economy.W. Li: U.S. Consumer Bankruptcy Choices 7
period2.7 Thereexistsasinglecreditorintheeconomy,andagentsborrowand
deposit with the creditor. Let rb denote the rate at which the agent borrows,
and let rd denote the deposit rate.
In period 1, an agent chooses consumption debt and/or asset holdings for
period 1 and effort for period 2. I denote these decision rules by c1, d2/a2, and
l2 respectively.8 The agent’s labor income shock described by θ2 is revealed
at the beginning of period 2. The probability distribution of θ2 conditional on
the signal θ1 increases in θ1 in the sense of ﬁrst order stochastic dominance,
i.e.,
F(θ2|θ 
1) ≤ F(θ2|θ1) for θ 
1 >θ 1,
F(θ2|θ1) is the cumulative distribution function for period 2’s labor income
shock θ2 given period 1’s signal θ1.
After observing his or her labor income shock for period 2, θ2, the agent
works at the effort level decided in period 1. The agent’s period 2 income,
therefore, consists of labor income and any interest earned on deposits. The
agentthendecideswhethertorepaythedebt,d2. Ifheorshedoesnotrepaythe
debt, the agent will ﬁle for either Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 bankruptcy. Under
Chapter 7 bankruptcy, the agent will keep his or her assets up to the maximum
amount that is exempted under the bankruptcy law, which I denote by E. The
agent surrenders remaining assets to the creditor, but keeps all labor income.
If Chapter 13 bankruptcy is chosen, the agent may keep all assets; however, a
portion ρ (0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1) of period 2 labor income will be used to pay off debts.9
In the theoretical discussion of this paper, I treat ρ as ﬁxed, independent of an
agent’s debt and earnings. I use x to denote an agent’s decision; x equals 1 if
the agent pays off his or her debt, x equals 7 if Chapter 7 bankruptcy is ﬁled,
and x equals 13 if Chapter 13 bankruptcy is ﬁled.
An agent suffers a utility loss, S, from a bankruptcy ﬁling of either type.
Thisutilitylossrepresentseitherthecostofhavingtoborrowatamuchhigher
rateinthefuturehadthemodelbeenofinﬁnitehorizon(amorerealisticcase),
or the stigma, the level of social disapproval of bankruptcy, or both. In the ﬁrst
case, S would be a function of the interest rate that an agent is charged if he
or she has to borrow again after ﬁling for bankruptcy and the agent’s average
income, income volatility, and desire to smooth consumption. The higher the
desire to borrow after bankruptcy, and the higher the postbankruptcy borrow-
ing rate, the higher the cost of ﬁling for bankruptcy will be. Consumption for
7 To simplify my analysis, without loss of generality, I assume away any labor decision in
period 1.
8 The labor effort here measures how hard a person works in terms of whether he or she
tries hard enough to get a well-paying job. Therefore, it is not something a court can mandate.
9 The implicit assumption is that while private agents cannot enforce a contract contingent
on an agent’s income, the government can, due to its special enforcement technology (by putting
an individual in prison, for example).8 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
period2issimplytheagent’sremainingincomeafterthepayment/bankruptcy
decision.
To summarize, the time line of the economy is as follows:
time period 1 period 2
information asset a1, period 2 labor income shock θ2
labor income signal θ1
decision rules consumption c1, asset a2, payment decision x,
borrowing d2, and effort l2 and consumption c2
Fortheanalysisthatfollows, Iassumethatanagent’sutilityfunctiontakesthe
formQ(c1)+E[U(c2)−S·1(x = 7o r1 3 )]−V(l 2), where Q  > 0,Q    < 0,
Q    > 0,U   > 0, U   < 0, U    > 0, V   > 0, V    > 0, and 1(.) is an indicator
function that takes the value 1 if the statements inside the parentheses are true
and takes the value 0 otherwise.
AnAgent’s Problem
To correctly present the choice problem of an agent in our economy, it is
helpful to think about it in reverse chronological order.
An Agent’s Period 2 Problem:
The Bankruptcy Decision
In period 2, agents are described by their assets, debt positions, labor ability,
and labor effort decision, namely (a2,d 2,θ2,l 2). They make payment and
consumption decisions to maximize period 2 utility as follows,
max
x,c2>0
U(c2) − S · 1(x = 7o r1 3 ) − V(l 2).
An agent faces three choices here: ﬁle for bankruptcy under Chapter 7,
ﬁle for bankruptcy under Chapter 13, or repay the debt. Let W7, W13, and
WR denote an agent’s period 2 utility under the three choices respectively.
The last option, of course, requires that the agent’s income exceeds the debt
payment, i.e., rda2 + θ2l2 ≥ rbd2. We then have the following expressions,
W7 = U(min{E,rda2}+θ2l2) − S, (1)
W13 = U(rda2 + (1 − ρ)θ2l2) − S, (2)
WR = U(rda2 + θ2l2 − rbd2), and rda2 + θ2l2 ≥ rbd2. (3)
Whentheagent’sincomeisnotenoughtorepaythedebt,i.e.,rda2+θ2l2 ≤
rbd2, he or she has no choice but to ﬁle for bankruptcy. I call this type ofW. Li: U.S. Consumer Bankruptcy Choices 9
Table 1 Parameter Values for Example 1
Parameter Values
bankruptcy cost (S ) 1.50
Chapter 7 asset exemption level (E ) 4.00
deposit rate (rd ) 1.00
borrowing rate (rb) 1.20
debt holding (d2) 7.00
period 2 labor decision (l2) 1.00
portion of income garnished under Chapter 13 (ρ) 0.45
bankruptcy ﬁling “involuntary bankruptcy.” The bankruptcy choice between
the two chapters will depend only on the agent’s period 2 consumption since
the penalty S applies in either case. When min{E,rda2}+θ2l2 ≥ rda2+(1−
ρ)θ2l2, the agent will ﬁle for bankruptcy under Chapter 7, but otherwise will
ﬁle under Chapter 13. More speciﬁcally, when the agent’s assets are below
theexemptionlevel, rda2 ≤ E, heorshewillalwaysﬁleforbankruptcyunder
Chapter 7; when the agent’s assets are above the exemption level, rda2 ≥ E,
he or she will ﬁle for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 only if a2 ≤ 1
rd(E +ρθ2l2).
The case where the agent has enough income to repay the debt is more
involved. An agent will ﬁle for Chapter 7 if his or her assets are below the
thresholddiscussedaboveandtheconsumptionbeneﬁtofﬁlingforbankruptcy
is at least S, i.e., U(min{E,rda2}+θ2l2) − U(rda2 + θ2l2 − rbd2) ≥ S. Let
  denote the utility difference U(min{E,rda2}+θ2l2) − U(rda2 + θ2l2 −
rbd2) − S. That is,   is the net beneﬁt of ﬁling under Chapter 7 compared to
paying off one’s debt.
∂ 
∂a2
= rdU (rda2 + θ2l2) − rdU (rda2 + θ2l2 − rbd2), if rda2 ≤ E;
−rdU (rda2 + θ2l2 − rbd2), otherwise. (4)
Given our assumption that U is concave, it is obvious that ∂ 
∂a2 ≤ 0. Similarly,
we can show that the utility difference   decreases in the labor income shock
θ2 and increases in the agent’s debt holding d2. It follows that the higher an
agent’s assets or labor income, and the lower the agent’s debt holding, the
likelier he or she is to repay the debt.
When the agent’s assets are above the threshold described earlier and the
cost of ﬁling for Chapter 13 is smaller than the bankruptcy cost S, U(rda2 +
(1−ρ)θ2l2)−U(rda2 +θ2l2 −rbd2) ≥ S, he or she will ﬁle for Chapter 13.




and labor income shock are higher and the debt holding is lower. When the10 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
agent has the income to repay the debt, ﬁling is often referred to as “voluntary
bankruptcy.”
Result 1 Given the period 2 labor income shock and debt holdings, as assets
increase an agent will ﬁle for bankruptcy ﬁrst under Chapter 7, then under
Chapter 13, and will repay the debt only if assets exceed some threshold. For
a given level of assets and as labor income increases, an agent will ﬁle for
bankruptcy ﬁrst under Chapter 13, then under Chapter 7, and will repay the
debt only if the labor shock exceeds some threshold.
The intuition behind Result 1 is straightforward. An agent will lose either
wealthorincomeafterﬁlingforbankruptcy. Agentswhohavesufﬁcientwealth
or income or both will, therefore, have no incentive to ﬁle for bankruptcy.
Chapter 7 exempts all labor income but only part of assets. As a result, agents
with good income but few assets will beneﬁt from Chapter 7. Chapter 13
protectsagents’assetsatthecostoftheirlaborincome. Consequently,Chapter
13 beneﬁts agents with large assets but low labor income. The following
numerical example illustrates Result 1.10
Example 1 Utility is logarithmic, i.e., U(c2) = log(c2). Parameters are
chosen as in Table 1.
Figure 2 depicts an agent’s bankruptcy decision in relation to his or her
period 2 assets and labor income shock. LineA describes asset-labor income
shock pairs for which the agent is indifferent between ﬁling for Chapter 7 or
Chapter 13, rda2 − ρθ2l2 − E = 0. The agent will ﬁle for Chapter 7 if this
expression is negative and will ﬁle for Chapter 13 otherwise. Line B consists
of assets and labor income shocks that are just enough to repay the debt,
rda2 +θ2l2 −rbd2 = 0. Agents with more income than debt lie above line B.
LineCistheindifferencecurveoftheagentbetweenﬁlingforbankruptcyand
repayingthedebt,i.e.,max(U(min[E,rda2]+θ2l2),U(rda2+(1−ρ)θ2l2))−
U(rda2 +θ2l2 −rbd2)−S = 0. Agents preferring to repay the debt lie above
this indifference curve.
AsseeninFigure2,anagentwillrepaythedebtifbothassetsandthelabor
income shock exceed the threshold set by line C. Underneath the repayment
line, the fewer assets agents have, the higher the labor income shock they
receive, and the more likely they are to ﬁle for Chapter 7. Conversely, the
more assets they have, and the lower their period 2 labor income, the more
likelytheyaretoﬁleforChapter13. Morespeciﬁcally, asillustratedinFigure
2, for the given value of a2,i fθ2 < θ, the agent ﬁles for bankruptcy under
Chapter 13, if θ ≤ θ2 < θ, the agent ﬁles for bankruptcy under Chapter 7,
10 Note that the examples presented in this article consist of magnitudes that are by no means
calibrated. They are included to illustrate the discussion.W. Li: U.S. Consumer Bankruptcy Choices 11
Figure 2 Agent’s Period 2 Bankruptcy Decision—An Example
and if θ2 ≥ θ, the agent repays the debt. An increase in debt d2 will move line
B and line C upward, reducing the region of debt repayment.
An Agent’s Period 1 Problem:
Portfolio and Labor Effort Decisions
Agents in period 1 make portfolio, consumption, and labor decisions to max-
imize their lifetime utility as follows,
max
a2,d2,c1,l2
Q(c1) + Eθ2|θ1 max(W7,W13,WR) − V(l 2)
s.t.
c1 + a2 = a1 + d2, (5)
c1,a 2,d 2,l 2 ≥ 0. (6)
I assume that the labor income shock θ takes value in [θmin,θmax]. Let θ
and θ denote the two thresholds so that given a2, d2, and l2, when θ2 ≤ θ,
an agent will ﬁle for bankruptcy under Chapter 13; when θ ≤ θ2 ≤ θ,a n
agent will ﬁle for bankruptcy under Chapter 7; when θ2 ≥ θ, an agent will
repay the debt (Result 1). The agent’s period 1 utility can then be rewritten
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This utility function is no longer concave; it consists of kinks where agents
are indifferent between two of the three choices. In the analysis that follows,
I focus on cases in which the equilibrium solution does not fall on any of
these kinks, in which case Euler equations are both necessary and sufﬁcient.
The qualitative results thus obtained can be generalized to other cases where
equilibrium occurs at a kink. I omit those analyses in order to save space.
Assuming interior solutions (all the choice variables take positive values),
Euler equations for this maximization problem are




U (rda2 + (1 − ρ)θ2l2)dF(θ2|θ1) + rd
  θ
θ




U (rda2 + θ2l2 − rbd2)dF(θ2|θ1), (7)
Q (a1 + d2 − a2) = rb
  θmax
θ
U (rda2 + θ2l2 − rbd2)dF(θ2|θ1), (8)
V  (l2) =
  θ
θmin








θ2U (rda2 + θ2l2 − rbd2)dF(θ2|θ1). (9)
When there are no bankruptcy provisions, Euler equations (7) and (8) for
a2 and d2 respectively become
Q (a1 + d2 − a2) = rd
  θmax
θmin
U (rda2 + θ2l2 − rbd2)dF(θ2|θ1), (10)
Q (a1 + d2 − a2) = rb
  θmax
θmin
U (rda2 + θ2l2 − rbd2)dF(θ2|θ1). (11)
Obviously, these two equations cannot hold simultaneously when the deposit
rate differs from the borrowing rate.11 This implies that an agent will not hold
bothassetsanddebtinperiod2intheabsenceofbankruptcyprovisions. When
thereareeitherChapter7or13bankruptcyprovisions,however,theagentmay
hold both assets and debt simultaneously. The intuition is that although debt
11 When the borrowing rate is the same as the deposit rate, the equilibrium condition pins
down the agent’s net asset position, d2 − a2.W. Li: U.S. Consumer Bankruptcy Choices 13
requires paying an interest rate premium, the prospect of not having to pay the
debt completely or part of it in the event of bankruptcy lowers the effective
rate an agent pays on his or her debts. In other words, bankruptcy provisions
encourageagentstoborrowtosave. LehnertandMaki(1999)alsoobtainsuch
a result in their paper through numerical simulation. They further argue that
this theoretical result is corroborated by household behavior as documented
in the Consumer Expenditure Survey.12
Result 2 With either Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 bankruptcy provisions, an
agent may simultaneously hold low-return assets and high-interest debt; with
no bankruptcy provisions, however, an agent will hold only one of the two
instruments.
With regard to labor effort, equation (9) suggests that an agent’s period 2
work effort is a decreasing function of the probability of ﬁling for Chapter 13.
This is a direct result of a Chapter 13 provision: Those who ﬁle under 13 lose
part of their income to their creditors.
Result 3 The work effort that an agent exerts in period 2 decreases as the
probability of bankruptcy ﬁling under Chapter 13 increases.
The effects of changes of a1 and θ1 on agents’ portfolio and bankruptcy
decisions are more complicated. When a1 increases, the agent does not need
to borrow as much from period 2 to increase consumption in period 1 since
now he or she can consume more period 1 assets. The reduced debt relative to
asset holdings will in turn increase the debt repayment region. Hence, agents
will take advantage of bankruptcy provisions less often.
An improved period 2 labor income prospect (larger θ1)implies that the
agent would like to borrow more to increase consumption in period 1. A
better labor income prospect in the sense of ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance
alsomeansthattheagentrepaysloansmoreoftengiventheamountborrowed.
In other words, the agent now enjoys the bankruptcy provision less often,
which will reduce borrowing in period 1. In this case, whether the agent will
borrow more when θ1 is higher depends on the net effect of the two forces.
Similarly, bankruptcy and labor effort decisions will be affected by opposing
forces.
Example 2 The agent’s utility takes the following functional form: log(c1)+
Eθ2|θ1[c2 − S · 1(x = 7 or 13)] − 1.25 ∗ l2
2. F(θ2) = (θ2)θ1, where θ1,
θ2 ∈ [0,1]. Other parameter values are summarized in Table 2.
12 The Consumer Expenditure Survey (CE) is an annual survey of about 5,500 households
conducted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Participants are surveyed four times over the course
of the year and are asked about their expenditures, assets, liabilities, and incomes.14 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Table 2 Parameter Values for Example 2
Parameter Values
bankruptcy cost (S) 2.06
Chapter 7 asset exemption level (E) 0.43
deposit rate (rd) 1.00
borrowing rate (rb) 1.06
portion of income garnished under Chapter 13 (ρ) 0.65
Table 3 Simulation Results of Example 2
Parameters Simulation Results
a1 θ1 a2 l2 d2 Chapter 13 Chapter 7 Repayment
(percent) (percent) (percent)
0.114 1.00 0.4985 0.5963 0.3937 0.2677 0.0715 0.6608
0.120 1.00 0.4993 0.5779 0.3734 0.2855 0.0177 0.6968
0.114 0.99 0.4976 0.5948 0.3926 0.2684 0.0737 0.6579
Table 3 summarizes results of the three experiments. According to these
experiments, agents with higher period 1 assets save more, borrow less, and
repay debt in period 2 more often. In the event of bankruptcy, they ﬁle for
Chapter 13 more often in order to protect their assets. As a result, they put in
less labor effort. Agents with inferior period 2 labor income prospects save
less and borrow even less, and repay debt in period 2 less often. In the event
that they become bankrupt, they ﬁle for Chapter 7 more often because they
hold fewer assets in period 2. Consequently, they exert more labor effort.
Financial Intermediation and Credit Market
Equilibrium
Thus far analysis has focused on a single agent, taking borrowing and lending
rates as given. I now introduce ﬁnancial intermediation and deﬁne a credit
market equilibrium. There is a single creditor in this economy. Without loss
ofgenerality,Icallthiscreditorabank. Agentsdepositwiththebankatraterd
andborrowfromthebankatraterb. Notethatborrowersarechargedthesame
rate irrespective of their assets and debt position. The implicit assumption
is that the lender does not observe borrowers’ assets and cannot set prices
according to loan size. This is a simplifying assumption. Alternatively, one
could make the lending rate a function of the borrower’s assets or loan size,
or even a signal regarding his or her period two labor income shock.W. Li: U.S. Consumer Bankruptcy Choices 15
The bank makes zero proﬁt under the assumption of competitive ﬁnancial
intermediation. Let G(a1,θ1) denote the ex ante distribution of agents over
period 1 wealth and period 2 labor income shock signals, and let there be a





















from agents who ﬁle for bankruptcy under Chapter 13, the second term is the
assets obtained from agents who ﬁle for bankruptcy under Chapter 7, and the
thirdtermistheloanrepaymentfromthosewhodonotdefault. Theright-hand
side of the equation is the cost of deposits. Obviously, the greater the number
of agents ﬁling for bankruptcy, the higher the borrowing rate the bank will
charge.
A general equilibrium of our economy consists of a pair of interest rates
(rd,rb) and a set of decisions (a2,d 2,l 2,x)such that given the interest rates,
(1) agents make decisions that maximize their expected utility, (2) the bank







The left-hand side of equation (13) is the deposits the bank collects from the
agents, and the right-hand side is the loans that the bank makes.
3. POLICY EXPERIMENTS
Most of the current proposals on bankruptcy reform center on three policy
instruments: the bankruptcy exemption, the percentage of wage income that
can be garnished by creditors in the event of bankruptcy, and the ﬁnancial
proﬁlesofagentswhomustﬁleforbankruptcyunderChapter13. TheNational
Bankruptcy Review Commission, for example, recommends large increases
in bankruptcy exemptions. The Gekas bill goes in the opposite direction
by forcing debtors in bankruptcy whose income is above the median to use
100 percent of their postbankruptcy earnings above a predetermined level to
repay debt. In this section, I analyze the implications of each of the proposed
bankruptcy law changes. In particular, I ask how these changes affect agents’
repayment and bankruptcy chapter choices, their ex ante portfolio decisions,
and their labor decisions and welfare.16 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly




the bankruptcy exemption in the model economy is increased from E1 to
E2. There are two immediate effects. First, Chapter 7 bankruptcy is now
more attractive than Chapter 13, though only for agents with medium assets.
Agentswhoseassetsarebelowρθ2l2+E1 willﬁleforChapter7undertheold
exemptionlevel,andagentswhoseassetsareaboveρθ2l2+E2 willnotﬁndthe
increase sufﬁcient for them to change their bankruptcy chapters. Only those
with assets between these two cutoff levels and whose labor income shocks
are not high enough to make debt repayment more attractive will switch from
Chapter 13 to Chapter 7.
Second, agents with assets between E1 and ρθ2l2 + E2 may also beneﬁt
from the increase in exemption by ﬁling for Chapter 7 rather than paying
off their debt. To demonstrate, recall that agents are indifferent between
ﬁling for Chapter 7 and repaying debt when U(min{rda2,E}+θ2l2}) − S =
U(rda2+θ2l2−rbd2). Theexemptionlevelaffectsthisequalityonlyifagents’
assets are above this level. Moreover, if agents’ assets are too high, either
Chapter 13 or repayment will be more attractive. Figure 3 depicts changes in
bankruptcy regions when E is increased from 4 to 8 using Example 1. All theW. Li: U.S. Consumer Bankruptcy Choices 17
lines carry the same interpretation as those in Example 1. The dotted lines
correspond to those under the new exemption level.
In period 1, because of the increased beneﬁts of ﬁling for bankruptcy
under Chapter 7, agents will save less and/or borrow more so that in period 2
they have a higher chance of ﬁling for bankruptcy under Chapter 7. This can
be seen in equation (8). The threshold θ increases with the increase in E; for
the equation to continue to hold, the agent needs to hold more debt relative
to assets. The general equilibrium effect of the increase in debt and decrease
in saving is that the deposit rate increases. In addition, the increase in default
(particularly Chapter 7 default) increases the borrowing rate. This increase in
borrowing rate will dampen the decrease in saving since agents will have to
rely more on saving to smooth their consumption. An increase in the deposit
rate clearly beneﬁts those who save, and an increase in the borrowing rate
hurts those who borrow. The implication is that increasing the exemption will
beneﬁt the rich and hurt the poor, especially those with good labor prospects.
Result 4 Given assets and debt, agents with medium assets and low labor
incomeshockswillbeneﬁtfromanincreaseintheexemptionbyswitchingfrom
Chapter 13 to Chapter 7. Agents with medium assets and medium income
shocks will beneﬁt from the increase in the exemption if they switch from
repaying their debt to ﬁling for Chapter 7. Ex ante, agents will exert more
labor effort. General equilibrium price changes may dampen these results.
Wage Garnishment
Inextdiscusstheeffectsofchangesinthepercentageofwageincomethatcan
be garnished by creditors in the event of Chapter 13 bankruptcy. This wage
garnishment is captured by the parameter ρ in the model.
Changesinρ affecttwotypesofmarginalborrowers: thosewhoareatthe
margin of ﬁling for Chapter 7 bankruptcy as opposed to Chapter 13 and those
whoareatthemarginofpayingofftheirdebtsasopposedtoﬁlingforChapter
13. A reduction in ρ will induce more agents in the ﬁrst group to ﬁle for
Chapter 13. The second group of borrowers repays debts because the utility
fromdoingsoishigherthanﬁlingforChapter13,i.e.,U(rda2+θ2l2−rbd2) ≥
U(rda2 + (1 − ρ)θ2l2) − S. A smaller ρ will increase the value of ﬁling for
Chapter13and,hence,willmakeagentslesslikelytopayoffdebts. Again,the
beneﬁts of a smaller ρ accrue more to agents with better labor income shocks.
Furthermore, since only agents with relatively greater assets will consider
ﬁling for Chapter 13, a reduction in wage garnishing will most beneﬁt rich
people with relatively high labor income shock. Figure 4 plots changes in
bankruptcy regions when I reduce ρ from 0.45 to 0.25 in Example 1.
In period 1, holding interest rates constant, marginal agents in the ﬁrst
groupwillincreasetheirsavings,whilethoseinthesecondgroupwillincrease18 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Figure 4 Changes of Bankruptcy Regions due to a Reduction in Wage
Garnishment
their borrowing to take advantage of the now more beneﬁcial Chapter 13
bankruptcy provision. Agents will also increase their labor effort since now
a smaller fraction of their labor income will be lost to creditors. If there is
excess aggregate saving in the economy, the deposit rate will drop so that the
aggregate saving equals aggregate borrowing in the new equilibrium. If there
isexcessaggregateborrowing,thedepositwillrisetoreachanewequilibrium.
The general equilibrium effect of a reduction of ρ on the borrowing rate is
twofold. On one hand, more agents will default, and the increased default
risk will cause the borrowing rate to increase. On the other hand, with more
Chapter 13 and fewer Chapter 7 ﬁlings the lender will be able to collect more,
which will tend to reduce the borrowing rate.
Result 5 Giventheirassetsanddebtpositions,agentswithgoodlaborincome
shocks and high assets will beneﬁt from a reduction in wage garnishment
under Chapter 13. The beneﬁts come from either switching from Chapter 7 to
Chapter13,orswitchingfromrepayingdebtstoﬁlingforChapter13. Exante,
agents respond to the changed incentives by either saving more or borrowing
more and by exerting higher labor effort.W. Li: U.S. Consumer Bankruptcy Choices 19
Figure 5 Changes in Bankruptcy Regions due to an Income Mandate
Income Mandate
Under an income mandate provision, if your income is above a certain cutoff
level, then you cannot ﬁle for bankruptcy under Chapter 7. The cutoff is often
determined according to the population income distribution. Let us suppose
that all the other provisions remain unchanged, including the exemption level
and the percentage of labor income that will be collected by creditors under
Chapter 13.
The implementation of such an income mandate corresponds to setting
a labor income shock threshold in our economy. Agents with a period 2
income shock above this level can ﬁle for bankruptcy only under Chapter 13.
The effects of the income mandate are straightforward. It affects only those
with the lowest amount of assets and medium labor income shocks. Those
with more assets will ﬁle under Chapter 13 even without the mandate, and
those with good labor income shocks will always repay their debts. Figure 5
depicts the imposition of a labor income shock cutoff equal to 4 in Example
1. The repayment line for low assets agent shifts down because of the income
mandate. Thereasonforthedownwardshiftisthatthebeneﬁtsfromﬁlingfrom
bankruptcy (Chapter 13 under the new rule) are fewer than before (Chapter
7). As a result, agents are more likely to pay off their debt.
In period 1, agents realize they will have to ﬁle for Chapter 13 more often
than in period 2; they will therefore put in less labor effort and will borrow20 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
less as a result. The reduced demand will drive down the deposit rate. The
borrowing rate will also come down since the borrowing premium will be
lower. More agents will ﬁle for Chapter 13, and more agents will pay off their
debts.
Result 6 Given assets and debt positions, an income mandate for Chapter 13
ﬁlinghurtsagentswithfewassetsandmediumlaborincomeshocks. Exantein
period1,agentswillnotworkashardandwillalsoreducetheirborrowing. In
general equilibrium, both deposit rates and borrowing rates will come down.
To summarize my policy discussion, a reduction in assets exemption level
under Chapter 7 beneﬁts agents with medium assets and medium labor in-
come shock. Ex ante, these agents save less and borrow more; however, they
also work harder. The general equilibrium price effects are likely to dampen
these results. A reduction in the percentage of wages that can be garnished
under Chapter 13 beneﬁts agents with high assets and medium labor income
shock. These agents switch to Chapter 13 bankruptcy from either Chapter 7
bankruptcy or repayment. Ex ante, these agents work less hard. Whether the
interest rate increases or not depends on the net changes of the total increase
in saving and the total increase in borrowing. Finally, an income mandate
hurts agents with medium labor income shocks and few assets. Ex ante, these
agents will not work as hard and will also reduce their borrowing.
Two points need to be made before I conclude. First, a two-period model
has been chosen to keep the analysis relatively simple and tractable. A proper
analysis of efﬁciency losses and distributional concerns would obviously re-
quire a fully dynamic model of bankruptcy choice. The extension of the
current model to an inﬁnite horizon makes the bankruptcy cost at least partly
endogenous(see“TheEconomicEnvironment,” above, foradiscussionofthe
bankruptcy cost); the bankruptcy decisions, therefore, become truly dynamic.
I speculate that most of the qualitative results of this article will survive this
extension.
A second point to bear in mind is that I assume that the portion of income
garnished under Chapter 13 is constant, while in practice it often depends on
the debtor’s income as well as his or her debts. Relaxation of this assumption
clearly would make Chapter 13 more attractive to those with fewer debts and
higher labor income shocks.
4. CONCLUSION
The recent surge in U.S. consumer bankruptcy ﬁlings has prompted many re-
form proposals. At the center of these proposals is the issue of consumer
bankruptcy choices, speciﬁcally whether agents should be encouraged to
choose Chapter 13 over Chapter 7.W. Li: U.S. Consumer Bankruptcy Choices 21
I have used a simple theoretical model with uninsurable labor income
to investigate two sets of issues: What are the ﬁnancial proﬁles of those
who repay their debts and those who ﬁle for bankruptcy under one chapter
or the other? and, What are the policy implications of the current reform
proposals, including efﬁciency and distributional concerns? With respect to
theﬁrstquestion, Iconﬁrmthegeneralviewthatagentswithrelativelygreater
assets prefer Chapter 13, while those with relatively high labor income prefer
Chapter7. Ialsoﬁndthatbankruptcyprovisionstendtoencourage“borrowto
save” behavior; that is, some agents will hold low return assets and high risk-
premium debt simultaneously. Furthermore, agents with a higher probability
of ﬁling for Chapter 13 will exert less labor effort.
I conducted three policy experiments: changes in the bankruptcy exemp-
tion under Chapter 7, changes in the percentage of labor income that can be
garnished under Chapter 13, and the implementation of a labor income man-
date for Chapter 13 ﬁlings. The experiments show that a reduction in the asset
exemption level, an increase in the percentage of labor income that can be ob-
tainedbycreditors, andtheimplementationofalaborincomemandatewillall
encourage Chapter 13 bankruptcy ﬁlings over Chapter 7 and the repayment of
debt. The efﬁciency cost of these changes is that agents will exert less effort,
causing total output (labor income in my model) to drop. In terms of income
andwealthdistributioneffects,threeconclusionsemerge. Changesintheasset
exemption level affect those with medium assets and medium labor income.
Changes in wage garnishment affect those with high assets and medium labor
income shock. The implementation of an income mandate affects those with
few assets and medium labor income.
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